NYT
A choice selection:
So, hmm, no blankets? No books? No getting up to take a piss before the final descent? Thanks, TSA! You'll make people more likely to dehydrate themselves when flying (increasing the risk for contracting diseases *and* getting DVT!) so they won't have to get up in that last hour.
And good luck not pissing off travelers when families with kids can't keep their kids occupied that final hour of the flight with books, DVDs, toys, or whatever the fuck else.
I feel so secure knowing that the TSA is protecting me from *yesterday's* terrorist threat. I'd feel much better if they tried to protect me from tomorrow's or next year's.
Poke around Bruce Schneier's site for more info.
ETA: From Schneier:
A choice selection:
passengers on international flights coming to the United States will apparently have to remain in their seats for the last hour of a flight without any personal items on their laps. Overseas passengers will be restricted to only one carry-on item aboard the plane, and domestic passengers will probably face longer security lines.
So, hmm, no blankets? No books? No getting up to take a piss before the final descent? Thanks, TSA! You'll make people more likely to dehydrate themselves when flying (increasing the risk for contracting diseases *and* getting DVT!) so they won't have to get up in that last hour.
And good luck not pissing off travelers when families with kids can't keep their kids occupied that final hour of the flight with books, DVDs, toys, or whatever the fuck else.
I feel so secure knowing that the TSA is protecting me from *yesterday's* terrorist threat. I'd feel much better if they tried to protect me from tomorrow's or next year's.
Poke around Bruce Schneier's site for more info.
ETA: From Schneier:
Security is both a feeling and a reality. The propensity for security theater comes from the interplay between the public and its leaders. When people are scared, they need something done that will make them feel safe, even if it doesn't truly make them safer. Politicians naturally want to do something in response to crisis, even if that something doesn't make any sense.
Often, this "something" is directly related to the details of a recent event: we confiscate liquids, screen shoes, and ban box cutters on airplanes. But it's not the target and tactics of the last attack that are important, but the next attack. These measures are only effective if we happen to guess what the next terrorists are planning. If we spend billions defending our rail systems, and the terrorists bomb a shopping mall instead, we've wasted our money. If we concentrate airport security on screening shoes and confiscating liquids, and the terrorists hide explosives in their brassieres and use solids, we've wasted our money. Terrorists don't care what they blow up and it shouldn't be our goal merely to force the terrorists to make a minor change in their tactics or targets.
Our penchant for movie plots blinds us to the broader threats. And security theater consumes resources that could better be spent elsewhere.